The article aims to summarize the literature about the profile of risk of orthorexia in athletes using the ORTO-15 questionnaire. The search was performed at PubMed, Embase, Web of Science, and Sport Discus databases, using the terms “orthorexia” AND “athletes” with the respective entry terms. A multistage process of selection followed the PRISMA 2020 recommendation. A total of 688 articles were identified, and six studies were available for the final process. The prevalence of risk for orthorexia was assessed by the (...) articles by the ORTO-15 questionnaire and ranged between 38 and 35 points. The comparison between male and female athletes and, athletes and non-athletes was not significant in the six articles. In conclusion, the review highlights that athletes from different sports, included in the review, do not present a risk of orthorexia nervosa considering the cutoff of 40 points, but not 35 points. Also, athletes present the same orthorexic behavior compared to non-athletes, demonstrating that orthorexia is an issue that needs to be considered in the general population. Moreover, a special focus should be given on the ORTO-15 questionnaire, about the sensitivity to diagnose the prevalence of orthorexia, especially in athletes. (shrink)

Parallel to Kemp's interest in contemporary science, one of his most consistent themes is the historical exploration of the possibilities of perceived and represented structures and patterns as organisational imperatives in nature and cognition. Structures in the context of Kemp's writing not only relate to the privileged observation sites of modern science but also act as instruments for an art history of contextually examined yet philosophically approached continuities.

El tema aquí propuesto rebasa los límites de un ensayo por centrarse en un escritor tan erudito y enciclopédico como Borges. Pero no se trata de una excepción, en realidad cualquier propuesta sobre su obra suele afrontar el mismo riesgo. Con esta idea en mente, mi ensayo intenta dar un resumen de los puntos de encuentro que Borges mantiene con algunos representantes de la Ilustración, como Berkeley, Hume, Jonathan Swift, Kant y Leibniz. En este sentido mi enfoque bosqueja un derrotero (...) epistemológico al adentrarse en teorías del conocimiento que, refutando postulados metafísicos y teológicos, instalan la vida humana, como diría José Isaacson, en la pendiente interminable de la pregunta. (shrink)

In all cultures, ethnomedical practices are largely the same for animals and people, whether in mode of administration of materia medica, in the materials themselves, or in surgical, mechanical, behavioral, medico-religious, and other realms. Below, parallels between veterinary and human ethnomedical techniques are outlined. Taken together, they suggest that a number of benefits could be gained by closer collaboration between veterinary and human medicine in the delivery of basic healthcare information and services.

The aim of this paper is to understand the place of tragedy and the tragic in Heidegger's philosophy. To do this, we analyzed a compilation of references in which the German philosopher mentions Greek tragedy or the notion of tragic. In the end, it was possible to conclude from his direct citations to tragedy and tragedy, that this theme is constituted and based on the way Heidegger thinks about the history of being, but not only that, it is possible to (...) see the reverse movement also occurring, that is, that Heidegger's philosophy of history can be read from the way the philosopher understands the tragic. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analysis of evil in Friedrich W. J. Schelling’s Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). Schelling develops an account of the sui-genesis of God out of the two principles. These principles are 1) the dark ground (dunkler Grund) that belongs to God and 2) the self-revelation of God, who actualizes the dark ground, which grounds God antecedently. These two principles also contain in themselves the possibility and the intelligibility of the human world. (...) In order to elucidate the ontological account of the possibility of evil in Schelling, I turn to Martin Heidegger’s analyses of Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift and especially to Heidegger’s account of self-will (Eigenwille) and put these analyses in conversation with Heidegger’s own thinking about αλήθεια. I establish a conceptual affinity between Schelling’s presentation of the dark ground, which for him is the ground of selfhood, and Heidegger’s insights into the prioricity of concealment (Verborgenheit). (shrink)

A questão do trágico é um importante eixo teórico da filosofia alemã pautado não somente na filosofia da arte, mas também no desenvolvimento de teses ontológicas que constituem a chamada filosofia do trágico. Heidegger, como herdeiro da tradição alemã, se debruçou sobre essa questão - principalmente em sua interpretação do primeiro estásimo da Antígona de Sófocles - que pode ser encontrada em diversos pontos de sua filosofia no período de 1935-1946. Inserindo-nos no debate da filosofia do trágico, nosso objetivo é (...) investigar: 1) de que modo a questão do trágico se manifesta em Heidegger; 2) em que medida Heidegger se diferencia ou se aproxima da filosofia do trágico e de autores que refletiram sobre essa questão, especificamente Hegel e Hölderlin. Nossa hipótese é que há uma via trágica original no pensamento heideggeriano, sustentada por sua noção conflitual de verdade, que é uma chave de leitura da história do ser, passível de ser construída em embate com Hegel e Hölderlin. (shrink)

'Marina G. Ogden offers a competitive and comprehensive outlook of the prominent Russian thinker Lev Shestov. This valuable book, based on the archive sources, provides a good historical background for Shestov's investigations which is very important for the better understanding not only Russian religious thought, but also Western philosophy of the twentieth century.'- Professor Teresa Obolevitch, The Pontifical University of John Paul II, Krakow 'The pioneering Russian existentialist Lev Shestov influenced Camus, Bataille, Celan and many others. In this absorbing (...) study, Marina G. Ogden shows how his "parable" of the many-eyed Angel of Death anticipates much recent thinking about trauma and its effect in setting a life on a unique and sometimes creative path.'- David M. Black, the author of Why Things Matter: The place of values in science, psychoanalysis and religion At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian émigré philosopher Lev Shestov (1866-1938) challenged traditional philosophical norms and brought the individual experience of the anxiety of death to the forefront of philosophical investigation. Based on new research and translations of Shestov's unpublished manuscripts, notes and correspondence, this book analyses the thoughts of one of the most influential thinkers of the past century in an interdisciplinary context. While uncovering the roots of the philosopher's existential position, the author traces Shestov's 'wandering through souls' of the world's most significant philosophers and writers within the context of a historical and biographical narrative, offering a close reading of his thinking in its chronological progression. A new interpretation of Shestov's philosophy, this comparative and hermeneutical analysis focuses on the thinker's continual search for meaning on the question of human mortality. Bringing together up-to-date research findings in Russian, English and French, an evolutionary analysis of the key notions in Shestov's philosophy the problems of truth, revelation, faith and death - is carried out in conjunction with the ideas of such pivotal figures in Western culture as Fyodor Dostoevsky, William James, Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber and Sigmund Freud. (shrink)

This dissertation gives what I consider to be the proper account of Edmund Husserl's theories of intentionality and meaning. This account stresses that meaning is the content of intentional acts of consciousness and thus establishes the necessary connection between meaning and consciousness. ;I also maintain that the two leading interpretations of Husserl's concept of the noema, the traditional interpretation of Aron Gurwitsch and the more recent interpretation of Dagfinn Follesdal, are unsatisfactory because each ignores some fundamental aspect of Husserl's concept (...) of the noema. Furthermore, I argue that Follesdal's misleading interpretation of the noema as a Fregean Sinn renders the connection between meaning and consciousness contingent and has facilitated the view, advanced by some recent commentators, that Husserl was primarily a linguistically motivated philosopher. ;I argue that, since for Husserl, the connection between consciousness and meaning is necessary, rather than contingent, no theory of meaning can be developed without first doing a phenomenological study of consciousness itself and of its essential characteristic, intentionality. ;In addition to this, I defend Husserl from criticisms raised against him by Martin Heidegger, Johannes Daubert, and George E. Oberlander. These criticisms are based upon misinterpretations of Husserl. I also consider a possible criticism against Husserl which might be raised by an adherent of Hilary Putnam's position that "meanings are not in the head". If meanings were mind-dependent, Putnam argues, communication would be impossible. I argue that the impossibility of communication does not follow from Husserl's position that meanings are mind-dependent. I demonstrate how Husserl accounts for communication by explaining that a speaker's intentions are intuited by a hearer when that speaker uses expressions to communicate his intentions. ;To conclude, I maintain that, because of the insightfulness of Husserl's theories of intentionality and meaning, it is imperative that phenomenologists go beyond the mistakes of the past and work to formulate an interpretation more faithful to Husserl's intentions. (shrink)

Shortly before the first publication of The Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche identified his philosophy as an “inverted Platonism.” Although, as Martin Heidegger warns, “we may not overlook the fact that the ‘inverted Platonism’ of his early period is enormously different from the position finally attained,” nonetheless, Nietzsche’s suspicion about otherworldly truths and optimistic faith in reason runs as a strong current throughout his works. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of Plato as the initiator of the “true world”—the world (...) that must be overcome on Nietzsche’s valuation—and of Socrates as a proponent of logicality suffers from the same overly rationalistic thinking that Nietzsche himself impugns in Plato. To account for Nietzsche’s interest in setting up Plato as the origin of the system of thought he seeks to overcome, I analyze Nietzsche’s remarks on Plato’s Phaedo in the Birth of Tragedy. (shrink)

Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of “knowledge” under consideration). In an influential paper, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have recently presented a fascinating and provocative big picture that challenges foundational assumptions of traditional Theory of Mind research (Phillips et al., 2020). Conceptually, this big picture is built around the main claim that ascription of knowledge is primary relative to ascription of belief. The primary form of Theory of Mind (ToM) thus is so-called factive ToM that (...) centres around knowledge-related mental states that are true rather than meta-representational ToM that centres around subjective epistemic states like belief that may or may not be true (Nagel, 2017; Phillips & Norby, 2019). Empirically, Phillips and colleagues build on converging findings from different areas: Ample research in developmental psychology shows that children track who has had informational access to events (and thus knows about the events) before they keep track of others’ potentially false beliefs (e.g., Perner & Roessler, 2012). Many studies from comparative psychology have found evidence that non-human great apes keep track of others’ perceptual and informational access while there is no convincing evidence that they keep track of others’ beliefs (Horschler et al., 2020; Martin & Santos, 2016; Call & Tomasello, 2008). And, work from cognitive psychology and experimental philosophy suggests that adults are faster, for example, to judge what others know than to judge what they believe (Phillips et al., 2018).In this commentary, we would like to critically evaluate and friendly amend the claims put forward by Phillips and colleagues. Conceptually, while we agree that some form of factive Theory of Mind is primary, we would like to raise doubts whether this primary factive ToM already involves full-fledged knowledge ascription. Empirically, we will point to potential test cases that are suitable to test Phillips and colleagues’ account against the friendly amendment proposed here. Is knowledge ascription really primary relative to belief ascription?We agree that the empirical findings reviewed by Phillips and colleagues do make a strong case for the conjecture that some form of factive ToM is indeed (phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and cognitively) primary. But we suspect that this claim, in unqualified form, may be somewhat incomplete and misleading. There is not necessarily one unitary form of factive ToM, and one notion of “knowledge“ in play across development and evolution, and perhaps not even in adults‘ Theory of Mind. This suspicion builds on several foundations: First, from an empirical point of view there have been, as highlighted by the authors, characteristic U-shaped developmental curves in some tasks of factive ToM – often a reliable indicator that different underlying processes are in play (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Second, from a theoretical point of view, conceptual change and dual process approaches to ToM and other forms of social cognition have highlighted the possibility of more complex developmental trajectories such that earlier and more basic forms of a conceptual competence may be supplemented and superseded by later and more sophisticated refinements (e.g. Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner, 1991). For the case of factive ToM, it may be that there is a basic and primitive notion of “knowledge“ in place early in ontogeny (and perhaps phylogenetically more ancient) that shares some of the essential features of our mature “knowledge” concept: “knowledge” in this broad sense, as emphasized by the authors, is factive, not modality-specific, and allows for representations of egocentric ignorance. For this basic concept, the slogan “knowledge before belief“ may well be true. However, this basic concept need not yet be our mature notion of knowledge proper and thus this basic form of factive ToM may fall crucially short of our adult form of factive ToM. Why? Because essential elements of our mature concept of knowledge are still missing: First of all, while so-called Gettier cases and other considerations make clear that knowledge does not reduce to justified true belief (one can have justified true beliefs that still do not amount to knowledge; Gettier, 1963), according to many accounts knowledge at least presupposes justified true belief. Correspondingly, ascription of knowledge would thus presuppose ascription of belief. Now, we understand that this is one of the very traditional assumptions that Phillips and colleagues challenge, and given space restrictions we will not focus on it here any further (see, e.g, Rose & Schaffer, 2013). But there is a second crucial aspect of knowledge proper that is missing from the basic notion: knowledge proper is aspectual, and consequently reports of knowledge proper are intensional, while neither seems to be the case of basic knowledge and reports of it. Knowledge proper is aspectual in the following sense: whether or not someone knows something depends on how, under which aspects, she has had informational access to a given scene. Suppose Eve has seen Clark Kent enter the house. Does she know that Superman is in the house? It depends. If she knows about the identity Clark Kent = Superman, she does, otherwise she does not. Consequently, knowledge ascription is intensional in the sense that the substitution of co-referential terms is not necessarily truth-value preserving: “Eve knows that Clark Kent is in the house“ does not imply “Eve knows that Superman is in the house”.Now, from the point of view of cognitive development, much research suggests that children’s appreciation of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes (and the intensionality of propositional attitude reports) develops in protracted ways not before the age of four (e.g., Apperly & Robinson, 1998; Rakoczy et al., 2015; Proft et al., 2019). In fact, recent studies suggest that around age four children undergo a fundamental and coherent cognitive revolution: they acquire a solid meta-representational notion of propositional attitudes that allows them to ascribe subjective aspectual representations that may or may not be accurate: Children come to solve false belief tasks that require belief ascription at the same time as tasks that require an understanding of aspectuality, and there is strong convergence/correlation between these different tasks (Rakoczy, 2017; Rakoczy et al., 2015). These considerations thus evoke a somewhat modified picture of the developmental course of factive Theory of Mind: Some form of factive ToM, indeed, comes first (developmentally and phylogenetically). In this primary stage, subjects track agents‘ cognitive relations to the world that display some of the essential signatures of knowledge proper (factive; not modality-specific; allow for representations of egocentric ignorance). Various approaches in ToM research over the last years have aimed at describing this basic form of knowledge-like relations, for example in terms of “cognitive connections“ (Flavell, 1988), “registration“ (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), “experiential records“ (Perner & Roessler, 2012) or “awareness relations“ (Martin & Santos, 2016). While differing in focus and details, all these accounts converge in stressing one crucial point: this early form of factive ToM allows observer to keep track of what others have or have not witnessed and, in this sense, what they do or do not know. It allows, in other words, so-called “Level I” perspective-taking (Flavell, 1977): understanding what others see. But this early form of factive ToM still falls short of knowledge ascription proper because it lacks an appreciation of the essential aspectuality of propositional attitudes in general and of knowledge in particular. In other words, it does not yet allow for “Level II” perspective-taking: understanding how different agents may represent a given scene (Fizke et al., 2017; Low & Watts, 2013; Oktay-Gür et al., 2018). Only later, around age 4, do children then develop the new meta-representational framework of propositional attitudes that goes beyond basic factive ToM. Once they have this framework and thus an understanding of aspectuality at hand, they can extend their initial and primary factive ToM to acquire the mature concept of knowledge (as at least presupposing true, justified belief, where belief is necessarily aspectual). So, while basic knowledge ascription indeed precedes belief ascription, full-blown attribution of aspectual knowledge develops in tandem with belief attribution. Or in other words: basic factive ToM precedes full-blown meta-representational ToM but full-blown factive ToM does not (since it is itself a part of full-blown meta-representational ToM). Empirical outlookThis slightly modified picture raises many interesting new empirical questions, and makes competing predictions relative to the picture put forward by Phillips and colleagues: From developmental and comparative perspectives, the modified picture would predict that “knowledge before belief” only applies for a circumscribed set of knowledge-related situations: those in which knowledge ascription does not require sensitivity to the aspectuality of knowledge (does not require distinguishing, for example, “Does she know that Clark Kent is in the house?” vs. “Does she know that Superman is in the house?”) and is limited to Level I perspective-taking. Young children before the age of four and non-human primates should be able to solve such non-aspectual knowledge ascription problems. But only older children from around age four, once they have acquired the full-fledged conceptual apparatus of meta-representation, should be able to handle aspectual knowledge ascription. Regarding adult functioning, the most fundamental question is: Do adults operate with one unitary factive ToM, as Phillips and colleagues assume? Or are there two kinds of factive ToM throughout the lifespan, as our modified picture suggests? In particular, does the more basic version remain in operation in adulthood, perhaps even as the default mode, that reveals itself under conditions of speeded responses, limited cognitive resources etc.? If the latter were true, specific performance patterns should be found. First, results such that adults are faster at knowledge ascription than at belief ascription (as found in Phillips et al., 2018) should be restricted to designs where knowledge ascription does not require any considerations of aspectuality. In such designs (as they were used in Phillips et al., 2018), subjects can make use of their primordial (non-aspectual) factive ToM in knowledge ascription, but have to use their full-fledged (aspectual) ToM in belief ascription. However, in new cases in which knowledge ascription is potentially aspectual (“Does Eve know that Superman is in the house?”), the speed difference between knowledge and belief ascription should vanish since both now require full-fledged (aspectual) ToM. Second, and relatedly, fast factive ToM should have characteristic signature limits to do with the lacking appreciation of aspectuality (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low et al., 2016): Subjects under speeded conditions (or in dual task formats in which their central cognitive resources are taxed) should be unable to systematically distinguish between “Eve knows that Clark Kent is the house” (true) and “Eve knows that Superman is in the house” (possibly true). No such signature limits should be expected, in contrast, under reflective conditions in which subjects can use their full-fledged and mature factive ToM. Interestingly, these hypothetical developmental and adult performance patterns would correspond to similar patterns found in the domain of modal judgments. Adults, it seems, have two notions of modality at their disposal: a more primitive (ontogenetically old) default notion that does not differentiate between descriptive and normative modals and thus yield characteristic signature limits; and more differentiated and nuanced notions (ontogenetically more recent) that do sharply distinguish between different forms of modality. What works fast and gets addressed in speeded tasks is the primitive default notion (in speeded tasks, adults tend to confuse what is possible with what is permitted, for example, in the way very young children do) whereas the more nuanced notions reveal themselves in reflective task settings in which adults are not subject to such confusions (Phillips & Cushman, 2017). Modality judgments and factive ToM may thus reveal striking analogies. Just like in the area of modality, then, there may be basic and default factive ToM, present from early on and in operation throughout the lifespan in speeded responses (and under other conditions of limited cognitive resources), and more sophisticated factive Theory of Mind that develops later on the basis of full-fledged meta-representation and that reveals itself in more reflective judgements. (shrink)

The subject of research in this article is some aspects of the life path of a prominent figure of the Reformation in Germany, Philip Melanchthon, which influenced the evolution of his worldview. Special attention is paid to the facts of his biography, the characteristics of his early works, as well as his assessments of the confessional struggle and calls for the active involvement of administrative resources to crack down on dissidents. The methodological basis of this article is the dialectical approach, (...) in particular, the principle of the relationship between the general and the singular, as well as the principle of the unity of the logical and historical. These principles allow us to identify the ethical nuances of the evolution of F. Melanchthon's views as a Reformation figure based on his statements and assessments. Philip Melanchthon is often evaluated in the scientific literature as one of the founders of the new faith, the second most important after Martin Luther, whose merit was the attempt to reconcile humanistic views and new confessional interests. However, based on a detailed analysis of the material presented in the article, the authors come to the conclusion that Philip Melanchthon, having devoted himself entirely to the Reformation, renounced the German humanistic tradition of the XV century, the values of humanism represented in the works of Jacob Wimplefing, Johann Reichlin, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Thomas More, John Colet. Therefore, its classification as "Christian humanism" is erroneous. (shrink)

: In his book Monad and Thou: Phenomenological Ontology of the Human Being, Japanese philosopher Hiroshi Kojima proposes to redefine the I-Thou relation, first extensively investigated by Martin Buber, and to reconcile the notions of ‘individuality’ and ‘community’ in terms of his new phenomenological ontology of the human being as monad. In this essay, Kojima’s ideas are examined concerning the monad and intersubjectivity, and it is shown how these ideas can be extended and brought to bear on issues concerning (...) human encounters with the environment and, in particular, to nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Se habla de las traducciones de Aristóteles y Pseudo-Aristóteles en tierras gallegas o realizados por gallegos en la Edad Media; así como los problemas inherentes a toda operación de traducción en cualquier época y circunstancia. Nos centramos en Pedro Gallego, representante de la 3º generación de los traductores de la corte toledana de Alfonso X el Sabio, de quien fue amigo y confesor, aunque afincado en Murcia y obispo titular de la recién recuperada sede de Cartagena. Y pormenorizamos las distintas (...) secuencias en el traslado de una de las obras capitales de Aristóteles, que tanto interesó a los árabes, del árabe al latín, el Liber de animalibus, compendio de diversos trabajos naturalistas y de biología, que traduce nuestro autor natural de Ortigueira (mariña lucense). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Theory?Oscar Martín (bio) and Simone Pinet (bio)Theory is, of course, a medieval word, brought from Greek into Latin from a common root (theastai) that also gives us theater, linked through shared meanings related to speculation, contemplation, and so forth. It is used in the Bible, and its English modern use, according to the Oxford english dictionary, probably comes from a medieval Latin translation of Aristotle. The dictionary does (...) not direct us to any specific translation, but prompts us to compare with Italian and, of course, French usage. In French, however, the word théorie was not used until quite late. In fact, it appeared for the first time in French in a 1584 translation of Antonio de Guevara, the famous Spanish court preacher and man of letters whose oeuvre was translated, imitated, and plagiarized in France, Italy, Germany, and England during the sixteenth century. In Spanish, the word theoria had begun its vernacular life a few years before in the writings of Fernando de Herrera.Theoria is already documented by Antonio de Nebrija’s Vocabulario español-latino of 1495, listed between “speculation” and “species” and designating the contemplative and the art of speculation, from theory to the perception of its quality. It is appropriate that Spanish would give theory to the West, sharing with it a point of view or, better, a series of perspectives or miradores, as María Rosa Menocal would call them, from which to look back into or beyond cultural and literary practices [“Visions of al-Andalus”]. For Medieval Iberia was, as this collection of essays purports to be, not a space or a history but a shifting and fluid gaze on the conflicting world surrounding the different literary and cultural works dealt with in this issue.Reluctant at best, and most of the time resentful of theoretical approaches to the study of literature and culture, medievalism found in Hispanism a surprising and most loyal ally. If in most Spanish departments critical theory pushed its way into the study of later periods, to the point that today even the mourning itself (or celebration) of the agony of theory is done from a theoretical standpoint, Hispanomedievalism remained suspicious longer, and sharpened its words on statistics and “scientific” claims to authority. Its close relationship to historical research, however, also made this philology vulnerable to the practices of interpretation. And it is as a will to interpretation that theory has managed to place itself within and outside the criticism of medieval Iberian literature and culture in insightful and renewing ways—including collective projects similar to the present one. Marina Brownlee’s contribution to this volume in this sense offers a most telling guiding thread of this continued approach to the discipline, which she helped revitalize through her participation in the project the new Medievalism. More recently, Josiah Blackmore and Gregory Hutcheson, also contributing to the present volume, sparked a lively debate, as showcased in a forum published by La corónica, with their project Queer iberia: sexualities, cultures, and crossing from the Middle ages to the renaissance. But a host of monographs and single-authored books in recent years have come to inhabit and enliven medieval studies as Hispanism has grown into the most important area of foreign language studies. [End Page 3]Theories find themselves in the articles for this special issue by way of a development from within. There is no application, no rigid use of conceptual frameworks to revisit texts, but an interior process of thought on and through the texts and cultural practices analyzed that produces theoretical insights. While a variety of methodologies and theoretical positionings can be identified, both explicitly and not, from speech-act theory to deconstruction, from Žižek to Badiou, postcolonialism to politics, these seem to emerge from within, as if the obvious result of the need to think questions posed from slightly different standpoints than they have been up until now. All of the articles reflect on very well-known texts and periods, pondering about a discipline, its methodologies, even the nature of its object of study. These articles do not dismiss previous work, but they do bring it under a new light.At a... (shrink)

Interactions and conversations with children, caretakers and other pedagogues take central stage in early childhood education. In this article, we investigate how future teachers in early childhood education reflect on dialogues and their own participation in practical conversation training from Philosophy for Children. We discuss these in the light of the triad address-responsiveness-responsibility, which has been considered central to genuine dialogues in dialogical ethics. In our study, the students´ express discomfort at the need to discuss matters in a manner that (...) is new to them, but also think that this form of conversation helps them to listen more actively to others. This insight about the difficulty of listening, and the possibility of developing into better listeners, is of significance in the formation of their professional identity and practice. (shrink)

Analysis of two medieval documents on the Celtic rite of the threefold death in Hispania, where hitherto it had been not yet noted. The legend of Santa Marina de Aguas Santas, in Orense, Galicia, is associated with a galaico-lusitanian switch-sauna for initiatic rituals of pre-Roman origin, while the story of the son of the King Alcaraz in the Castillian Libro de Buen Amor (14th century) is a new example of Hispanic Celtic literature, derived from the Arthurian cycle of Merlin, (...) originated in Wales and Brittany, but with some Persian influence. (shrink)

Los Cuadernos, de los cuales se publican aquí los seis primeros de la serie, eran llamados por Heidegger, indiferentemente, Arbeitshefte (Cuadernos de trabajo) o Schwarze Hefte (Cuadernos negros). Esta última denominación se explica —como en el caso de El Cuaderno rojo de Marina Zvetáieva, que apareció en 2011 en Éditions des Syrtes— por el color de su encuadernación. Esta última, en lo que concierne a los Cuadernos de Heidegger, era dura y recubierta por un hule negro. El conjunto de (...) sus hojas linda con las 100 páginas, en un formato cercano a nuestra media página A4. (shrink)

Improvising involves participants adopting attitudes and dispositions that make them welcoming towards what happens, even when it is unforeseen. How is the discourse on improvisation and a disposition to improvise in the community connected to the concept of inquiry? What type of reasoning can be developed? This paper aims to reflect on two different perspectives. On the one hand, we consider the feasibility of improvising inquiry in the community, promoting inquiry as an activity that can be developed extemporaneously when teacher (...) and students form a community with an “improvising” habitus. On the other hand, we underscore the intrinsic improvisational dimension of inquiry that takes shape in philosophical dialogue in the community. To develop these two educational and formative perspectives, participants students and particularly teachers must first acquire a “readiness” for improvisation which is a sort of complex attitude. Some results of previous research on improvisation are presented to explain and emphasize the features of this complex disposition. Teachers who improvise suddenly open a window on events happening in the community, serving as an example for the class which is invited to do the same. Teachers thus become improviser-facilitators within the community, embracing the feature of a new jazz-pedagogy at the same time. (shrink)

A century ago, John Dewey remarked that when home changes radically, school must change as well. With home, family, and gender roles dramatically altered in recent years, we are faced with a difficult problem: in the lives of more and more American children, no one is home. The Schoolhome proposes a solution. Drawing selectively from reform movements of the past and relating them to the unique needs of today's parents and children, Jane Martin presents a philosophy of education that (...) is responsive to America's changed and changing realities. As more and more parents enter the workforce, the historic role of the domestic sphere in the education and development of children is drastically reduced. Consequently, Martin advocates removing the barriers between the school and the home--making school a metaphorical "home," a safe and nuturant environment that provides children with the experience of affection and connection otherwise missing or inconsistent in their lives. In this proposition, the traditional schoolhouse where children are drilled in the three Rs is transformed into a "schoolhome" where learning is animated by an ethic of social awareness. At a time when many school reformers are calling for a return to basics and lobbying for skills education and quick-fix initiatives, Martin urges us to reconsider the distinctive legacies of Dewey and Montessori and to conceive of a school that integrates the values of the home with those of social responsibility. With cultural diversity and gender equality among its explicit goals, the schoolhome expands upon Dewey's edict to educate the "whole child," seeking instead to educate all children in the culture's whole heritage. Martin eloquently challenges reformers to reclaim the founding fathers' vision of the nation as a domestic realm, and to imagine a learning environment whose curriculum and classroom practice reflect not merely an economic but a moral investment in the future of our children. More than a summons to action, this remarkable book is a call to rethink the assumptions we bring to the educational enterprise, and so, to act wisely. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that (...) these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well. (shrink)

Wie wollen wir leben und wie können wir unserem Leben Sinn geben angesichts der drängenden Krisen der Gegenwart? Wie können solche Fragen überhaupt beantwortet werden, wenn eine säkulare Kultur scheinbar nur Antworten auf Fragen nach dem „wie?“, nicht aber nach dem „wozu?“ erlaubt. Martin Kolmar deutet im vorliegenden Buch die gegenwärtigen und bevorstehenden Krisen, allen voran die Klimakrise, als Krise der westlichen Denk- und Wahrnehmungsweisen und versucht einen Ausweg daraus aufzuzeigen. Dazu beginnt er mit einer Analyse westlicher Vorstellungswelten aus (...) der Perspektive des „Erhabenen“. Es zeigt sich, dass das „Erhabene“ als Grenzerfahrung überraschende und relevante neue Perspektiven auf die Gegenwart öffnet und zugleich einen Weg zu einer säkularen, rationalen Form der Sinnerfahrung erkennbar macht. Das Besondere dieses Buches ist die Verknüpfung philosophischer und gesellschafts- und kulturwissenschaftlicher Forschung mit Erkenntnissen der Psychologie und der Neurowissenschaft. Es zeigt auf, dass traditionelle Vorstellungen des „Guten Lebens“ und der Verortung der eigenen Existenz als Teil der Natur, mit moderner Forschung korrespondieren. Ist man bereit, sich hierauf einzulassen, stellt insbesondere die Bedrohung durch die Klimakrise nicht nur ein mögliches Katastrophenszenario und eine große technologische Herausforderung dar, sondern eine Chance für ein besseres Leben, welches aus einer anderen Haltung ihm gegenüber resultiert. (shrink)

This article tracks the historical emergence of a new visual convention in the representation of the risks associated with climate change. The “reasons for concern” or “burning embers” diagram has become a prominent visual element of the climate change debate. By drawing on a number of cultural resources, the image has gained a level of discursive power which has resulted both in material mobility and epistemic transformation as the diagram itself has become a tool for a variety of actors to (...) reason with. The case brings to light a number of challenges associated with attempts to know and visualize abstract concepts such as risk and danger, including the social organisation of knowledge production and the role of expert judgment in contexts where science is asked to retreat from normativity. (shrink)

Food sovereignty can be conceptualized as a political proposal for social change in the field of agri-food relations. However, specific strategies of how to achieve this transformative potential are diverse, and context-dependent. The paper explores this diversity by examining discourses on the food sovereignty construction process in Catalonia. Using Q methodology we have explored visions held by individuals participating in the social movement for food sovereignty, identifying five discourses: activism, anti-purism, self-management, pedagogy, and pragmatism. Key strategies of transformation include social (...) mobilization, institutional negotiation, self-management, education to foster value change, and politics of the possible. The relevance assigned to ideological affinity explains different views on the subject of transformation, particularly regarding the involvement of the administration and the productive sector. As regards transformative strategies, discourses assign differing importance to the role of agency for effecting social transformation, which influences their assessment of individual actions as an effective means for social change. Forms of individualized and classic collective action currently coexist within the Catalan agri-food movement, but such diversity is not acknowledged as an effective alliance towards food sovereignty. Moreover, all discourses agree to a dual definition of food sovereignty, both as a process, that is, as democratization of the decision-making process in the agri-food sector, and as a result, that is, establishing an agri-food model alternative to the neo-liberal one. However, the discourses share an unclear view of democracy as decentralized collective decision-making that does not make explicit how this model should be implemented to achieve social control of the agri-food system. (shrink)

The ability to sequence individual genomes is leading to the identification of an increasing number of genetic risk factors for serious diseases. Knowledge of these risk factors can often provide significant medical and psychological benefit, but also raises complex ethical and social issues. This paper focuses on one area of rapid progress: the identification of mutations causing long QT syndrome and other cardiac channel disorders, which can explain some previously unexplained deaths in infants (SIDS) and children and adults (SUDS) and (...) prevent others from occurring. This genetic knowledge, discovered posthumously in many cases, has implications for clinical care for surviving family members who might carry the same mutations. The information obtained from genetic testing, in the context of personal and family history, can guide individually tailored interventions that reduce risk and save lives. At the same time, obtaining and disclosing genetic information raises difficult issues about confidentiality and decision making within families. We draw on the experience of the Montefiore-Einstein Center for Cardiogenetics, which has played a leading role in the genetic diagnosis and clinical management of cardiac channel diseases, to explore some of the challenging ethical questions arising in affected families with adolescent children. We focus on the related issues of (1) family confidentiality, privacy and disclosure and (2) adolescent decision making about genetic risk, and argue for the value of interdisciplinary dialogue with affected families in resolving these issues. (shrink)

NOTE: This paper is a reworking of some aspects of an earlier paper – ‘What else justification could be’ and also an early draft of chapter 2 of Between Probability and Certainty. I'm leaving it online as it has a couple of citations and there is some material here which didn't make it into the book (and which I may yet try to develop elsewhere). My concern in this paper is with a certain, pervasive picture of epistemic justification. On this (...) picture, acquiring justification for believing something is essentially a matter of minimising one’s risk of error – so one is justified in believing something just in case it is sufficiently likely, given one’s evidence, to be true. This view is motivated by an admittedly natural thought: If we want to be fallibilists about justification then we shouldn’t demand that something be certain – that we completely eliminate error risk – before we can be justified in believing it. But if justification does not require the complete elimination of error risk, then what could it possibly require if not its minimisation? If justification does not require epistemic certainty then what could it possibly require if not epistemic likelihood? When all is said and done, I’m not sure that I can offer satisfactory answers to these questions – but I will attempt to trace out some possible answers here. The alternative picture that I’ll outline makes use of a notion of normalcy that I take to be irreducible to notions of statistical frequency or predominance. (shrink)

On May 18, 1958, Martin Heidegger led a one-day colloquium in Freiburg on the topic of “Art and Thinking” together with Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, the Japanese philosopher and Buddhist scholar. The protocol of the colloquium, published in volume 16 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, presents a conversation among the colloquium participants about art in the East Asian world. In this conversation, Heidegger is particularly interested in hearing from Hisamatsu about the conception of art present in the East Asian world prior to the (...) introduction of Western aesthetic concepts and about the relationship between form and formlessness in East Asian aesthetics. The conversation allows Hisamatsu to clarify for the participants what he takes to be the most essential features of Zen art and how these features compare with those found in modern Western abstract art. (shrink)

Martin Hollis; The Pen and the Purse, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 153–169, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.197.

The paper identifies some background assumptions of compositionality in formal semantics and investigates how they shape formal semantics as a scientific discipline.

Arnaud Martin Le 29 août 2018, le président du gouvernement espagnol Pedro Sánchez annonça la création d’une commission de la vérité sur les crimes commis durant la guerre civile et la dictature franquiste. Ainsi devait prendre officiellement fin la politique d’impunité et d’amnésie politique imposée au peuple espagnol au lendemain de la mort du général Franco par la loi du 15 octobre 1977, confirmée trente ans plus tard par la loi du 26 décembre 2007, comme contrepartie des mesures d’amnistie (...) prises en faveur des condamnés politiques et comme prix à payer pour assurer la réussite du processus consensuel de transition démocratique. La mémoire historique qui avait été refusée aux Espagnols allait pouvoir devenir réalité. La commission s’inscrit de façon originale dans la logique de la justice transitionnelle. En effet, l’élaboration de la vérité historique annoncée par Pedro Sánchez a pour but, non pas d’assurer la transition démocratique et la pacification d’une société postconflictuelle, mais de prévenir la « déconsolidation » démocratique à laquelle pourraient conduire la non-reconnaissance des torts subis par les victimes du franquisme et l’impossibilité de l’Espagne – notamment de la droite – à tourner la page du franquisme. (shrink)

In this open access book, Angela K. Martin thoroughly addresses what animal vulnerability is, how and why it matters from a moral point of view, and how it compares to human vulnerability. Vulnerability has been an important topic in bioethical discourse over the last forty years. Its predominant focus was on human vulnerability but recently, animal vulnerability has become a topic of philosophical investigation as well. She carefully explores both human and animal vulnerability, bringing out both their similarities and (...) their differences, and she shows how vulnerability discourse can be made fruitful for animal ethics. This is an open access book. (shrink)

Dynamic logic, broadly conceived, is the logic that analyses change by decomposing actions into their basic building blocks and by describing the results of performing actions in given states of the world. The actions studied by dynamic logic can be of various kinds: actions on the memory state of a computer, actions of a moving robot in a closed world, interactions between cognitive agents performing given communication protocols, actions that change the common ground between speaker and hearer in a conversation, (...) actions that change the contextually available referents in a conversation, and so on. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a (...) question-begging stance. We propose thereby to modify the criterion in such a way as to exclude the character of the non-virtuous agent from the morally relevant circumstances. Finally, we examine the implications of our proposal for the issue of moral development. (shrink)

When in 1980, on the Third Amsterdam Colloquium, Johan van Benthem read a paper with the title ‘Why is Semantics What?’ (cf. [1]), I was puzzled: Wasn’t it obvious what semantics is? Why did our concept of it stand in need of justification? Later, much later, I came to appreciate what Van Benthem was doing in this paper (and in some others). Questioning the ‘standard model’, the assumptions on which the working semanticists silently agree, Van Benthem opened up a space (...) of issues to be discussed, questions to be asked, routes to be explored, that had been hidden from view by the unreflective endorsement of just one possible, albeit fruitful way of doing semantics. History, by the way, has proven him right on many points: the monolithic approach that dominated formal semantics of natural language in the seventies, and which relied heavily on Montague’s seminal papers, has given way to a multitude of different ways of tackling semantic issues, using different formal techniques. Some limitations, in particular the almost exclusive focus on sentences as the primary units of analysis, have been overcome. In another respect, however, I feel that the message of Van Benthem’s paper has not caught on sufficiently. He urges semanticists to take more interest in the properties of their tools, arguing that such questions are important if we are to come to a real, deep understanding of what semantics is. Such ‘meta-level’ considerations, although certainly less scarce than they used to be, are still not an everyday concern of the working semanticist. (shrink)